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THIS YEAR MARKS the fiftieth anniversary of the death of NishidaKitarO (1870-1945), the foremost philosopher of contemporary 
Japan, who established a unique philosophical system through East- 
West encounter. Deeply rooted in the traditional Oriental way of think­
ing and yet widely read in the Western philosophical systems, Nishida 
opened up a new spiritual horizon to work out a distinctive philosophi­
cal logic called the logic of Absolute Nothingness or the logic of place 
(basho).
In the following, we will discuss why his logic is called the logic of 
Absolute Nothingness and what is meant by the logic of place. In this 
regard, special attention will be placed on the affinity and disparity be­
tween Hegel’s philosophy of absolute Idea (Idee) and Nishida’s philos­
ophy of Absolute Nothingness.
I
From the beginning of his philosophical career, Nishida was concerned 
with the problem of “ true Reality” and the systematic treatment of 
various philosophical issues on that basis. In his writings we see that 
Nishida persistently sought Reality in the direction of consciousness, 
first taking pure experience, then self-awakening, Tathandlung, abso­
lutely free will, and intuition to be Reality. He progressively deepens
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his thought by first rejecting intellectualism for voluntarism, and then 
by shifting from voluntarism to intuitionism. The standpoint in which 
the knower and the known become one emerges through this develop­
ment. It is the standpoint of knowing without a knower and seeing 
without a seer—in other words, the standpoint of consciousness that is 
truly the subject, not the object, of the consciousness. To remove the 
threat of subjectivism otherwise inescapable in such a standpoint and 
lay a logical foundation for the Reality found therein, Nishida takes up 
Aristotle’s hypokeimenon (substratum or substance), since for Aris­
totle Reality is pursued not in the direction of consciousness but in the 
direction of objects. Defining Substance as “ the subject that cannot 
become predicate,”  Aristotle seeks true Reality and the formation of 
judgement in the direction of the grammatical subject, i.e., in the direc­
tion of objects in the sense that the subject of a proposition is an object 
of thought. Since Aristotle’s logic concerns itself with the grammatical 
or logical subject, it is a kind of objective logic, the logic of objective 
thinking. Nishida makes use of Aristotle’s hypokeimenon and his no­
tion of the individual (i.e., the grammatical subject) as mediating fac­
tors, but goes beyond them as well.
Nishida was convinced that in order for the individual as the gram­
matical subject (Substance) to be known, there must exist that which 
encompasses it, the place in which it lies, and that this place must be 
sought in the plane of the “ transcendent predicate,” not in the direc­
tion of the logical subject. In Nishida’s philosophy, which thus probes 
the structure of judgement in terms of Aristotle’s logic of grammatical 
subject, the foundation of judgement is found in universals rather than 
in individuals, in the direction of the predicate rather than in that of 
the grammatical subject. The direction of the predicate is the direc­
tion of consciousness, and the plane of the transcendent predicate 
which subsumes the individual as grammatical subject is “ place” or 
“ Nothingness” as the field of consciousness. By grasping the plane o f  
consciousness as the plane o f  predicates through the mediation of 
Aristotle’s hypokeimenon, Nishida gives a logical foundation to im­
mediate and direct consciousness, to seeing without a seer, which other­
wise cannot escape subjectivism and mysticism. In the process, he also 
lays a logical foundation for Reality.
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II
Nishida is not satisfied with Aristotle’s view of individuals, however. 
Aristotle’s individual is a seen individual, not an acting one. If an in* 
dividual is moved by an unmoved prime Mover, it must be said not to 
change or act by itself. To Nishida, an individual is always the acting or 
actor that acts by itself. Moreover, Nishida considers Aristotle’s exami­
nation of single individuals to be insufficient. Because an individual 
can be an individual only in opposition to other individuals, Nishida 
examines the relationship between one individual and another. (This is 
a natural result of his understanding of an individual as an actor.) He 
thus understands this relationship between individuals as a process of 
dynamic inter-action. His analysis includes the factors of time and 
space, in that the spatial and temporal world is inseparable from the in­
dividual.
Nishida spoke of a subsumptive judgement as “ a particular lying 
in the place of a universal.”  He viewed a particular as “ that which lies 
within” a universal, and a universal as the “ place within which the 
particular lies.”  “ That which lies within”  expresses the subject dimen­
sion of the judgement while “ place” expresses the predicative dimen­
sion of the judgement. The predicative dimension is consciousness: the 
subjective dimension is that towards which consciousness is directed. 
As the predicative dimension (place) grows more encompassing or sub­
sumptive, consciousness grasps more and more fully the dimension of 
the subject.
III
According to Hegel, a concrete Universal, unlike an abstract universal, 
contains a principle of individualization through which it develops dis­
tinctions within itself while maintaining self-identity.
This self-differentiation is completely self-determined. To Nishida, if 
a judgement is to be established, there must be something single and un­
differentiated at its base. In other words, something intuitive precedes 
judgement.
Hegel views the ultimate concrete universal as an Idea (Zdee), and 
judgement (Urteil) as a primordial division (Ur-teileri). Nishida’s con-
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Crete universal roughly corresponds to Hegel’s, although he describes it 
quite differently. To both thinkers, a concrete universal is not deter­
mined from the outside by something else. As something undifferen­
tiated, it forms itself from within. Nishida thought that judgement is 
based on this sort of intuitive concrete universal, and it is from this per­
spective that he sets forth his notions of “ place” and “ that which lies 
within.”
Aristotle’s individual is “ the subject that cannot become a predi­
cate,” i.e., the “ transcendent subject” beyond predication, the ulti­
mate subject. Beyond all conceptualization, it is true Substance. Such 
an individual, however, is trans-rational in that it cannot be subsumed 
by a conceptual universal and can be known only by intuition. And yet 
Aristotle also held that a Substance must be definable. For individuals 
to be known, there must be a universal which can encompass them. Biit 
can the Hegelian concrete universal truly subsume the Aristotelian 
individual? This problem can be solved only if we shift from the stand­
point of the abstract universal to the standpoint of the concrete uni­
versal.
Hegel conceives of the ultimate concrete universal as absolute 
“ Idea”  which develops dialectically an sich (in itself), fiir sich (for 
itself), and an und fiir  sich (in and for itself). This dialectical logic 
includes negative mediation and the sublation-preservation (aufheben) 
of contradiction. The Idea goes outside itself while developing dia­
lectically: it “ self externalizes” itself (selbstentausserung). It does 
not, however, merely leave itself: in going outside itself through self­
negation it simultaneously returns to its own interior, and in this way 
it never loses its self-identity. In this self-determination, it encompasses 
everything within itself.
Can this concrete universal totally subsume the Aristotelian individ­
ual, “ the subject that cannot become a predicate,” the Substance that 
defies all predication and conceptualization? Hegel points the concrete 
universal as that which is most universal and general. In terms of the 
form of judgement, it is the last predicate, the most subsumptive predi­
cate which encompasses everything. Even if it is deemed the most sub­
sumptive final predicate, it is never the most generic concept, for clear­
ly it differs from an abstract universal. It is dialectical, not analytical; it 
includes self-negation within itself. Nevertheless, when this concrete 
universal is defined as “ Idea,” can it truly subsume a particular in its
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individuality? Can this universal completely subsume an individual 
without marring its uniqueness and trans-rational concreteness?
IV
However dialectical and self-negating Hegel’s concrete universal might 
be, insofar as it is “ Idea” (Idee), the individual’s unique singularity is 
inevitably universalized, and its transrational concreteness rational­
ized. For this reason, his philosophy has been attacked as being pan- 
logistic. Due to this panlogistic character, Hegel’s concrete universal 
cannot encompass Aristotle’s individual in its transrational concrete­
ness.
Nishida’s philosophy, which attempts to free itself from all subjecti­
vism by grappling with Aristotle’s individual, harbors a critique of 
Hegelian philosophy from its own point of view. Nishida argues that 
when the concrete universal is the idea, even though it is dialectical, it is 
nevertheless something called “ absoluter Geist" that rationalizes the 
individual’s trans-rationality. And insofar as it is something, there must 
be a “ place” in which the absolute idea itself lies. This does not mean 
that Hegel’s Idea is something in the ordinary sense, for it includes self­
negation within itself. But, since it is not Absolute Nothingness but ab­
soluter Geist, strictly speaking, it is still not completely free from 
“ somethingness.” However universal and all-inclusive the Idea may 
be, insofar as it is not pure “ place”  but is still something, i.e., that 
which lies within, we must ask about its “ place.”  Hegel’s Idea, there­
fore, is not the final transcendent predicate and hence not the ultimate 
concrete universal.
To Hegel, the Idea is the ultimate concrete universal which subsumes 
everything in its self-unfolding. In one sense we may say that Hegel’s 
Idea is the place in which all things lie, and hence the most subsumptive 
place. Insofar as this place in which all things lie is nothing other than 
the “ Idea” or “ absoluter Geist," but not yet “ absolute nothingness,” 
we must still ask about the place in which that Idea itself lies. Since the 
ultimate Idea is the most subsumptive place in which all things exist, 
the place in which this Idea lies cannot be a substantial place. Rather, it 
must be the place of no-thingness. As discussed above, however, the 
Idea itself is not a mere something (etwas); as the concrete universal 
with a dialectical character, it includes the principle of self-negation
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within itself and therefore has a fundamental character of unobjectifia- 
ble no-thingness. Accordingly, the place in which this Idea lies cannot 
be the place of relative nothingness, i.e., “ nothingness” as a counter­
concept to “ somethingness.”  Rather, it must be Absolute Nothing­
ness, which is completely beyond the duality of somethingness and 
nothingness, and encompasses even Hegel’s Idea with its character of 
nothingness. This ultimate place which is Absolute Nothingness but 
not the Idea, is the final concrete universal. We no longer need to, nor 
are able to inquire into the existence of place in which Absolute 
Nothingness lies, for Absolute Nothingness is in no sense “ something” 
at all or “ that which lies within,”  but is instead “ the place in which 
everything, positive and negative, lies.”  Absolute Nothingness itself is 
place: nothing else can be called the true place.
V
Absolute Nothingness, not Hegel’s Idea, is the ultimate concrete univer­
sal. We can demonstrate this by asking whether Hegel’s Idea is the last 
predicate. In terms of the form of judgement, Hegel’s Idea, as that 
which subsumes everything within itself, is the ultimate predicate. On 
the other hand, the ultimate subject, i.e., Aristotle’s individual, is the 
subject that can never become predicate, the “ transcendent subject” 
which is beyond ordinary subject-predicate judgement. Likewise, ac­
cording to Nishida, the ultimate predicate in the true sense must be the 
predicate that can never become subject. Hegel’s Idea is not the ulti­
mate predicate in this sense, for it can be the object of a judgement 
(i.e., a grammatical subject in statements asserting that the Idea is such 
and such.) Since it is thus objectifiable, the Idea cannot be regarded as 
completely beyond subject-predicate judgement as such. The true ulti­
mate predicate, that is, the predicate that is never a grammatical sub­
ject, cannot be subsumed by any superordinate predicate, and hence 
can never be determined or defined in any way. It is completely undeter­
minable and undefinable. It is nothingness, and cannot even be deter­
mined as the “ Idea” or “ God.” Absolute Nothingness is determined 
neither as nothingness nor as being. (That is, we cannot say that Abso­
lute Nothingness is such and such.) Understood in this sense, we can 
conceive of Absolute Nothingness as the true final predicate.
With this notion of Absolute Nothingness, Nishida transcends the
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predicative dimension of judgement and stands upon the place of the 
“ transcendent predicate,”  i.e., upon the place of Absolute Nothing­
ness in contrast to the “ transcendent subject”  or individual which tran­
scends the dimension of the grammatical subject. Both the direction of 
the grammatical subject and the direction of the grammatical predicate 
are transcended, and the one unique individual as “ transcendent sub­
ject”  is subsumed by Absolute Nothingness as the “ transcendent predi­
cate.”  Nishida fully agrees with Aristotle’s definition of the individual 
subject as that which can never become the predicate. But he does not 
stop at this notion and instead develops the idea of “ the predicate that 
can never become the subject” as the ‘place’ wherein the singular in­
dividual exists. The idea of the “ transcendent subject”  as well as that 
of the “ transcendent predicate” are thoroughly radicalized. Both the 
transcendent subject and transcendent predicate can be transcendent 
with respect to each other within the nonabiding place of Absolute 
Nothingness. Dual transcendence of the subject with respect to the 
predicate and of the predicate with respect to the subject is established 
through the boundless openness or the uncircumscribable emptiness of 
Absolute Nothingness. This dual transcendence is characteristic of the 
subsumption of interactive individuals by Absolute Nothingness. This 
is not a problem of mere method, but a problem of philosophical prin­
ciple. We herein make immediate contact with the individual for the 
first time. That is, through the realization of Absolute Nothingness, 
the individual is fully known by us in its concrete immediacy without 
any conceptualization. Expressed in Nishida’s terms, the individual 
is realized as “ that which lies within” Absolute Nothingness (i.e., it 
rests in Absolute Nothingness, its place), and in Absolute Nothingness 
determines itself without being determined from the outside by any 
other thing. This self-determination of the individual just as it is, is the 
self-determination of “ place” or Absolute Nothingness and the self- 
determination of the world.
VI
This is the logic of Absolute Nothingness which can be called the logic 
of place in Nishida’s philosophy. The basis of this logic of place is 
Nishida’s notion that the individual is the self-determination of the 
universal (place or Absolute Nothingness) and as such, transcends
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generic concepts. The logic of place is a predicative logic in the radical 
sense, not a logic of the grammatical subject. Hence it stands in con­
trast to all forms of traditional Western “ objective logic”  which, strict­
ly speaking, never fully transcend the subject-predicate structure. It is 
not a logic about the act of seeing or of knowing nor is it a logic about 
that which is seen and known objectively in terms of the grammatical 
subject; rather, it is a logic of “ place,”  which is prior to, and the 
source of, both seeing and knowing and that which is seen and known. 
It is a Subjective or existential logic prior to the opposition of subject 
and object, a logic of totally unobjectifiable self-awakening. In com­
parison with the logic of place, which is Absolute Nothingness, Aristo­
tle’s logic of the grammatical subject, Kant’s highly subjectified tran­
scendental logic, and Hegel’s dialectical logic are all logics of objective 
consciousness and in this regard do not escape objective thinking. 
Consequently, they fall short of the logic of truly existential self­
awakening.
The logic of place, however, neither confronts objective logic nor 
excludes it. Although we term it predicative logic, this does not signify 
logic without a subject. As its own self-determination, the logic of 
place grasps all grammatical subjects without marring their unique­
ness. Place reflects all individuals and their mutually determining way- 
of-being within itself and realizes them as its own self-determination. 
In this regard, the logic of place is the logic of the self-establishment 
of the objective world and includes objective logic as a necessary factor 
or moment. The logic of place is not the form of the thinking of the 
subjective self. Rather, it is the form of the self-expression of true Real­
ity in and through Absolute Nothingness. Since Nishida’s philosophy 
of place is a logic of thoroughgoing subjective and existential self­
realization, it is at the same time the logic of the establishment of the 
objective world.
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